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Abstract 
 
We follow individuals as they retire using discrete-time hazard models applied to a stock 
sample from 12 waves of the British Household Panel Survey. Results confirm that health 
shocks are a determinant of retirement age and are quantitatively more important than 
pension entitlement.  This is the case for both men and women and is observed for both a 
measure of health limitations and a measure of latent health status obtained from a 
generalized ordered probit model.  Further, our results provide evidence that, for women, 
the health status of their partner impacts on their retirement decisions; an effect that is not 
evident for men.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Until recently, the UK (along with most developed countries) experienced a trend towards earlier 
retirement, especially among men. Along with more generous social security systems and the 
introduction of early retirement options in pension systems, early retirement plans were advocated 
to ‘solve’ unemployment problems, with early retirees making room for younger unemployed 
individuals. More generous health and disability insurance systems also contributed to the trend by 
enabling individuals in bad health to drop out of the labour market without facing severe financial 
consequences. This ‘disability route’ into retirement has been identified as an important phenomenon 
in the UK labour market (Blundell et al., 2002).  
 
A recent survey for the UK Department for Work and Pensions (Humphrey et al., 2003) explored 
the factors affecting labour market participation among 2800 people aged between 50 and 69. 50% 
of the sample stated that they were not seeking work due to ill-health, and 20% reported that they 
had been forced to retire or leave a job because of ill-health. However, the relationship between 
health and retirement is a complex one. It is difficult to estimate a causal effect because health and 
work are jointly determined and there are problems finding an appropriate measure of health for 
use in this context. In order to usefully investigate the relationship it is necessary to use longitudinal 
data, and in this way we can track the same individuals from work into retirement, thus providing 
an appropriate counterfactual.  
 
While there is a plethora of evidence on the importance of financial incentives for the retirement 
decision there is much less that considers the relationship between health and retirement and very 
little in the European context. The few studies that do exist have confirmed the importance of 
health but have rarely taken into account the dynamics of the relationship or the influence of  health 
on retirement within couples, both of which are considered here. We use data from the first 12 
waves, from 1991 to 2002, of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to investigate the 
influence of health shocks on the age of retirement. We extend previous approaches by using a 
generalised ordered probit model to purge the self-reported measure of health of reporting bias. A 
further issue of interest is that the majority of people in this age group live as a couple and 
decisions on when to retire are often taken at the household level. Hence we also consider the 
effect of spousal health and labour market status on an individual’s decision to retire.  
 
We follow individuals as they retire using discrete time hazard models applied to a stock sample. 
This allows us to address the problems of endogeneity and unobservable individual heterogeneity. 
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Results confirm that health is an important determinant of the decision to retire.  This is the case 
for both men and women and is observed for both a measure of health limitations and a measure 
of latent health stock, obtained from an innovative generalized ordered probit model of self-
assessed health. As expected, negative shocks to health result in increases in the hazard of 
retirement.   Further, our results provide evidence that, for women, the health status of their 
partner impacts on their retirement decisions.  This effect is not evident for men. 
 
 
2.  Methodological issues  
 
Economic theory on the relationship between retirement and health (for example Lazear, 1986) 
states that agents have preferences over current and future leisure which depend, inter alia, on 
current and expected health status. Poorer health reduces the probability of continued work 
because it may: increase the disutility of work; reduce the return from work (via lower wages); 
entitle the individual to benefits and other non-wage income that is contingent on not working. A 
possible counteracting affect is that poorer heath may increase consumption requirements (for 
example via increased health care costs) therefore necessitate higher income. However, if poorer 
health also reduces life expectancy then the annualised consumption available from existing wealth 
is raised, and this may still lead to earlier retirement.  
 
There is a growing literature on health and work, and for older workers the retirement decision is a 
key part of this. Health effects operate alongside the effects of the pensions and benefits system, 
and there is an enormous literature on the importance of these financial incentives in determining 
retirement behaviour (see Lumsdaine and Mitchell, 1999 for a review). However Lindeboom 
(2006), in a comprehensive review of evidence on health and retirement, argues that a number of 
empirical studies have suggested that health is the most important determinant of an older persons’ 
labour supply; a finding rejected by other studies, which point to problems in finding an 
appropriate measure of health and problems arising from the endogeneity of health in models of 
retirement.  
 
2.1 Self-reported health 
 
In attempting to identify a causal effect of health on the retirement decision, the use of subjective 
measures of health has been a focus of much attention (see for example, Anderson and Burkhauser. 
1985; Bazzoli, 1985; Stern, 1989; Bound, 1991; Kerkhofs and Lindeboom, 1995; Bound et al., 1999; 
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Disney et al., 2006). When using survey data, the researcher is usually limited to measures of self-
reported health. In the BHPS for example, one health measure derives from the question: 
 
“Please think back over the last 12 months about how your health has been. 
Compared to people of your own age, would you say that your health has on the 
whole been excellent/good/fair/poor/very poor?”  
 
This measure of self-assessed health (and many like it from similar surveys in other countries) 
provides an ordinal ranking of perceived health status that has been used widely in studies of the 
relationship between health and socio-economic status. However, some commentators have 
rejected the use of these subjective measures in favour of more objective measures of health status 
because of the potential biases that may result (for example, Myers, 1982, Stern, 1988 and Anderson 
and Burkhauser, 1985).  
 
There are many reasons why one may expect biases to arise when modelling the impact of health 
on the timing of the retirement transition. First, self-reported measures of health are based on 
subjective judgements and there is no reason to believe that these judgements are comparable 
across individuals.  Secondly, self-reported health may not be independent of labour market status.  
Thirdly, since ill-health may represent a legitimate reason for a person of working age to be outside 
the labour force, respondents who are not working may cite health problems as a way to rationalize 
behaviour.  Fourthly, for individuals for whom the financial rewards of continuing in the labour 
force are low there exists a financial incentive to report ill-health as means of obtaining disability 
benefits, this is often cited as the ‘disability route into retirement’ (Riphahn, 1997; Blundell et al., 
2002). For example, in a study of social security benefit programmes in the Netherlands, Kerkhofs 
and Lindeboom (1995) show that recipients of disability insurance systematically overstated their 
health problems.   
 
Bound (1991) identifies the bias that results from each of the above problems.  Reporting 
heterogeneity resulting in a lack of comparability across individuals in self-assessed health (SAH) 
represents measurement error that leads to an underestimation of the impact of health on labour 
force participation.  Conversely, endogeneity in the health-retirement relationship will lead to an 
overestimation of the impact of health.  These biases will also have implications for the estimation 
of the impact of socio-economic characteristics that are correlated with SAH.  Indeed, Bound 
argues that SAH is in part, determined by socio-economic factors and that should the impact of 
health on labour market activity be correctly estimated the impact of economic variables may still 
be biased.  
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Bound (1991) also points out, however, that we cannot be sure that objective measures are any 
better predictors of the relationship between health and labour market status; objective measures of 
health are unlikely to be perfectly correlated with the aspect of health that affects an individual’s 
capacity for work.  As such, objective measures of health will suffer from an error in variables 
problem leading to downwardly biased estimates of the impact of health on retirement.  Whereas 
the biases involved in using self-assessed measures of health act in a way so as to counteract each 
other, the bias associated with objective measures of health operates in one direction only and 
hence may be more problematic in empirical applications. 
 
Empirical studies on the role of health in retirement provide mixed conclusions about the 
endogeneity of SAH and the extent of the bias provided through measurement error. For example, 
while Kerkhofs et al., (1999) find that the choice of health measure (SAH versus more objective 
measures) does affect the estimates of health on labour market outcomes, Dwyer and Mitchell 
(1999) conclude that SAH is not endogenous and their models of labour market retirement do not 
suffer significantly from measurement bias.  Further, by applying a direct test for measurement 
error Au et al., (2005) report significant error in their SAH variable. However, when this measure 
was used to predict retirement behaviour it gave similar results to those obtained from using a more 
objective measure of health and to those obtained through instrumental variable approaches.  
 
Of further relevance is whether a change in labour market status (into retirement) is more 
influenced by ‘shocks’ to an individual’s health or by a levels effect (for example, a slow 
deterioration in health status).  It is often argued that modelling health ‘shocks’ is a convenient way 
to eliminate one source of potential endogeneity bias caused through correlation between 
individual-specific unobserved factors and health (see for example, Disney et al., 2006).  This is due 
to the identification of a health ‘shock’ through, for example, differencing the data over consecutive 
time periods which consequently implies eliminating unobserved individual fixed effects.  Disney et 
al., (2006) find that health shocks are an important determinant of retirement behaviour in the UK, 
and that positive and negative health shocks tend to have symmetric effects.  
 
Riphahn (1999) has also investigated the dynamic effect of health shocks on the employment and 
income of older workers. She finds significant effects of a health shock on leaving employment and 
finds small reductions in individual and equivalent household income. Riphahn also shows that 
health shocks seem to happen more often to those individuals/households which are already at the 
lower end of the income distribution before the health shock occurs. For the US, Bound et al., 
(1999) use 3 waves of the Health and Retirement Study to consider the retirement behaviour of 
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men and women aged 50-62. They find that changes in health are as important as the long-term 
level of health in determining the retirement age.  
 
2.2 Joint decision making among couples   
 
Predictions regarding the joint labour market decisions of older couples can be derived from the 
family labour supply model of Killingsworth and Heckman (1986).  Couples maximise a single 
utility function subject to a household budget constraint in which income is pooled. This model 
assumes that spouses have the same preferences, which can therefore be aggregated, and while it 
has been used in many empirical studies (see for example Blau and Riphahn, 1999) it has been 
criticised for this key assumption. Bargaining models that allow for spouses to have different 
preferences have been developed in an effort to overcome this limitation (Gustman and Steinmeier 
2000; Lundberg and Pollak, 1996).  
 
There is a weight of empirical evidence supporting the importance of the joint determination of the 
retirement decision of husbands and wives1 (see for example Hurd, 1990; Jiménez-Martín et al.,  
1999; Blau and Riphahn, 1999; Michaud, 2003; Wu, 2004). In a recent development Gustman and 
Steinmeier (2000) estimate a structural model of retirement in dual-career families motivated by the 
observed tendency of couples to retire together in the US. The model is based on a non-
cooperative bargaining model, and allows for simultaneous determination of retirement behaviour 
dependent on age, birth cohort, health and the retirement status of the spouse. The results suggest 
that the primary reason for spouses retiring together is shared preferences for leisure, with each 
individual valuing retirement more highly when their spouse has also retired.  Health is an 
important factor in the individual’s decision to retire but the model does not allow estimation of the 
effect of say a husband’s health on the wife’s retirement decision.  
 
 
3. Econometric methods 
3.1 Duration models of retirement  
The starting point for our analysis is the stock-sampling approach of Jenkins (1995). This method 
represents the transition to retirement as a discrete time hazard model enabling us to estimate the 
effect of covariates on the probability of retirement. The covariates will include health status and 
                                                 
1 The use of the terms husband and wife does not imply anything about the legal status of the relationship 
and is also applied here to people living as couples who are not legally married.  
 6
various socio-economic characteristics such as age, sex, housing tenure, education and pension 
entitlement (see section 4.2).  
 
The Jenkins (1995) approach relies on a reorganisation of the data so that the unit of analysis is 
changed from the individual to the time at risk of an event (in this case retirement). This allows a 
complex sequence likelihood to be simplified to standard estimation for a binary outcome. The 
approach also controls for ‘stock sampling’ since we sample only those people who are in the 
labour market at wave 1. These individuals can then either stay in the labour force or exit into 
retirement. The assumption here is of a single exit (retirement) from the initial state (working), 
modelled as a binary probit.   
 
Adopting the notation of Jenkins (1995), we use data for a stock sample of all individuals who are 
working in wave 1 (t =τ ). t = 1 is the earliest year at which an individual is at risk of retirement 
(initially we assume this is at age 50). At the end of the time period for which we have data some 
people will still be working (censored duration data, iδ = 0), and some will have retired (complete 
duration data, iδ =1). t =τ + si is the year when retirement occurs if iδ =1 and the final year of our 
data period if iδ = 0. Each respondent, i, contributes si years of employment spell data from the 
interval between the start of the observation period and the final wave. Then define the discrete 
time hazard rate as ρit = P [Ti = t | Ti ≥ t ; xit], where xit is a vector of covariates which may vary 
with time and Ti is a discrete random variable representing the time at which the end of the spell 
occurs.  
 
The main issue for modifying the sample likelihood function for this model to take account of 
stock sampling is that the probabilities for both those who complete spells (retire) and those who 
do not are conditioned on them not having retired at the beginning of the sample time period 
(wave 1).  Jenkins (1995) shows that the log-likelihood for this kind of event history data can be 
simplified by defining: 
yit = 1 if t = τ  + si and iδ =1, yit = 0 otherwise. 
For stayers yit = 0 for all spell periods. 
For exiters yit = 0 for all periods except the exit period.  
 
The log-likelihood is then simplified to a more standard form for analysis of a binary variable yit 
where the unit of analysis is now the spell period, i.e. actual estimation is a simple binary model for 
the reorganised data set. The reorganised data set consists of multiple rows of observations for each 
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individual with as many rows as periods at risk. In this way the reorganised data set resembles panel 
data.  
 
To complete the specification of the model, an expression for the hazard rate is required. We 
specify a complementary log-log hazard rate which is the discrete-time counterpart of the hazard 
for an underlying continuous-time proportional hazards model (Prentice and Gloeckler, 
1978): ( )(( tX itit ))θβρ +−−= expexp1 , where ( )tθ  is the baseline hazard.  We complete the 
specification by modelling ( )tθ  as a step function, by using dummy variables to represent each 
period at risk.  This non-parametric form for the baseline hazard leads to a semi-parametric 
specification of the discrete-time duration model2. The model can be generalised to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity uncorrelated with the explanatory variables (Narendrenathan and 
Stewart, 1993).  All estimation is carried out in STATA. The discrete time proportional hazards 
models are estimated using the pgmhaz routine (Jenkins, 1997).  
 
 
3.2 Models for self-reported health  
 
The approach we use to dealing with the issues associated with measurement error (reporting bias) 
and endogeneity of the health-retirement relationship extends the principles set out in Bound 
(1991) and implemented in Bound et al.,(1999) and subsequently adopted by Au et al., (2005) and 
Disney et al., (2006). This involves estimating a model of SAH as a function of more objective 
measures of health to define a latent ‘health stock’ variable. This health stock variable is then used 
as an indicator of health in the model of retirement.  The idea of constructing a health stock 
variable is analogous to using more objective measures of health to instrument the endogenous and 
potentially error-ridden SAH variable.     
 
We use a latent variable model to construct an index of health (health stock) for individual i at time 
.  Specifically, consider the aspect of health that affects an individual’s decision to retire, , to be 
a function of a comprehensive set of objective measures of health, 
t Rith
itz 3, such that: 
                                                 
2 An alternative is to specify a parametric form for the baseline hazard, most commonly, to assume this has a 
Weibull distribution by specifying ( ) ( )tt log=θ . 
3 Bound et al. (1999) and others consider objective measures of health together with socio-economic 
characteristics as predictors of self-assessed health.  We only use objective measures of health and reserve the 
use of socio-economic characteristics as predictors of reporting bias, as described later in this section. This 
makes the stringent assumption that, conditional on the objective measures, any association between SAH 
and SES reflects reporting bias and not genuine variation in health. This assumption may be too strong if the 
objective of the analysis was to model the determinants of health, but our purpose is to provide a measure of 
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 itit
R
it zh εβ += ,    iTtni KK ,2,1;,,2,1 ==   (1) 
 
where itε is a time varying error term uncorrelated with .   itz
 
We do not directly observe  but instead observe a measure of SAH, .  We can specify the 
latent counterpart to as  such that: 
R
ith
S
ith
S
ith
*
ith
 
it
R
itit hh η+=*      iTtni KK ,2,1;,,2,1 ==  (2) 
 
where itη  represents measurement error in the mapping of to and is uncorrelated with .  
Substituting (1) into (2) gives: 
*
ith
R
ith
R
ith
 
itititititit zzh νβηεβ +=++=*   iTtni KK ,2,1;,,2,1 ==   (3) 
 
The presence of itη in (3) represents measurement errors and is the source of the bias that would 
be obtained if we were to use directly when estimating the impact of health on retirement 
behaviour.  If 
*
ith
itη were distributed randomly, it would represent classical measurement error. This 
would attenuate the effect of health on retirement. Alternatively, if itη were a function of labour 
market status such that, for example, individuals rationalise early labour market exit through 
reporting ill-health, then this would lead to overestimates of the effect of health on retirement 
transitions (Bound, 1991). To avoid the biases associated with using  directly in our models of 
retirement, we use the predicted health stock, , which is purged of measurement error.  
*
ith
*ˆ
ith
 
Combining (3) with the observation mechanism linking the categorical or dichotomous indicator, 
, to the latent measure of health, , and assuming a distributional form for ith
*
ith itν we can estimate 
the coefficients, β . For example, in the case of the categorical self-assessed measure of health the 
observation mechanism can be expressed as, 
  
                                                                                                                                               
exogenous variation in health that is purged of reporting bias. For that reason, it is better to err on the side of 
caution and use only the objective health indicators as ‘instruments’. 
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mjhifjh jitjit ,...,1,
*
1 =≤<= − µµ       (4) 
 
where, ∞=≤−∞= + mjj µµµµ ,, 10 .  Assuming is normally distributed, model (3) can 
be estimated as an ordered probit using maximum likelihood.   
itv
 
A further problem arises if individuals with the same level of underlying health, , apply different 
thresholds, 
*
ith
jµ , when reporting their SAH status.  This systematic use of different thresholds 
reflects the existence of reporting bias (Kerkhofs and Lindeboom, 1995; Lindeboom and van 
Doorslaer, 2004).  These differences may be influenced by, among other things, age, gender, 
education, income, language and personal experience of illness.  In their analysis of reporting bias 
Lindeboom and van Doorslaer (2004) distinguish between index shift and cut-point shift.  Index shift 
occurs if the shape of the distribution of SAH remains the same, but there is a change in its 
location such that there is a parallel shift in all of the reporting thresholds for particular sub-groups 
of the population.  This parallel shift in the distribution may be due to a shift in the cut-points 
(reporting bias) or due to a shift in the underlying measure of “true health” (heterogeneity) and in 
general, it is not possible to separately identify the two reasons for index shift. If the reporting bias 
is due to cut-point shift, this implies that there is a change in the relative positions of the reporting 
thresholds for particular sub-groups of the population.    
 
We extend model (3) to take into account reporting bias.  This can be achieved by considering the 
generalised ordered probit model (GOP).  The GOP model allows the relaxation of one of the 
restrictive characteristics of the ordered probit model: the constancy of the threshold parameters, µ,  
such that: 
 
µij = µj + δj’ xit  for all j        (5) 
 
where xit represent socioeconomic factors assumed to influence the threshold parameters.  Given 
(3), (4) and (5) we have: 
 
P(hit = j |zit, xit,) = Φ ((µj +δjxit )- βzit) - Φ ((µj-1 +δjxit ) - βzit )    (6) 
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This provides a specification in which the coefficients vary across categories of SAH, as a result of 
cut-point shift. The pooled GOP is estimated directly by full information maximum likelihood in 
STATA, with robust standard errors corrected for the clustering within-individuals4.  
 
The predicted values for the health stock can be used in the model of the impact of health on 
retirement.  In our example, the predicted health stock would enter as a regressor in a discrete-time 
duration model of retirement.  Adopting this instrumental variable-type procedure where a proxy 
with error (here, detailed health variables as an imperfect predictor for SAH) is used to instrument 
an endogenous and error-ridden variable (here, self-reported general health or health limitations) is 
a standard way of dealing empirically with errors-in-variables (see also, Griliches, 1974 and Fuller, 
1987).  Further, since our approach to estimation relies on sampling individuals who are 50 years or 
over and are active in the labour market at the first wave (these individuals are deemed `at-risk’ of 
retirement) concerns surrounding the extent of measurement error in SAH are lessened.  The 
motivation for such individuals to report worse than actual health is presumably less than for 
individuals who have already left the labour market (see McGarry (2002) as an example of how this 
`stock-sampling’ approach is used to deal with the possibility of measurement error in SAH). As an 
alternative to the predicted health stock we also use an arguably more objective measure of health 
(health limitations), which is described more fully in Section 4.2.  
 
 
3.3 Health shocks 
 
To identify a health shock we include as variables in our duration model of retirement a lagged 
measure of health together with initial period health. For all model specifications the health 
variables are derived using the instrumental variables procedure outlined above.  By conditioning 
on initial period health we can interpret the estimated coefficients on contemporaneous health as 
representing a deviation from some underlying health stock.  In this way the parameter estimate 
represents the effect of a health shock.  The relative effects of the estimated coefficient of initial 
period health and contemporaneous health is informative of whether it is a health shock that 
determines retirement or a levels effect observed through continual poor health (see Bound et al., 
1999).  It also seems plausible that lagged health may be more informative about the decision to 
retire simply because transitions take time (it may take time to adjust fully to a health limitation to 
enable an individual to assess his/her ability to work or to learn whether an employer can or will 
accommodate a health limitation).   The use of lags has the advantage of reducing fears of 
                                                 
4 The Stata program for the GOP is available from the authors on request. 
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endogeniety bias by exploiting the `timing of events’ by observing the effect of health shocks prior 
to the time of retirement.  
 
 
4. Data 
 
4.1 The stock sample 
 
We exploit the panel data available in the first twelve waves (1991-2002) of the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS). This includes rich information on socio-demographic and health variables.  
The BHPS is a longitudinal survey of private households in Great Britain, and was designed as an 
annual survey of each adult (16+) member of a nationally representative sample of more that 5,000 
households, with a total of approximately 10,000 individual interviews.  The first wave of the survey 
was conducted between 1st September 1990 and 30th April 1991. The initial selection of households 
for inclusion in the survey was performed using a two-stage stratified systematic sampling 
procedure designed to give each address an approximately equal probability of selection. The same 
individuals are re-interviewed in successive waves and, if they split off from their original 
households are also re-interviewed along with all adult members of their new households.   
 
We apply stock sampling methods to define our sample of respondents of interest.  The stock 
sample is designed to treat the sample as all individuals at risk of retirement at the first wave of 
observation as a cohort of all those present at wave 1 who could then be followed-up over the 
subsequent eleven waves.  The sample of interest consists of those individuals who were original 
sample members aged 50 or over and had provided a full interview and were in work (defined here 
as employed or self-employed) in the first wave of the survey.   
 
The sample is of n = 1135 individuals, 494 women and 641 men, who are then followed through 
the twelve annual waves of the surveys to see if they leave the labour market due to retirement5. 661 
individuals are present for all 12 waves, but others are lost due to sample attrition and death6.  Our 
retirement models are estimated on complete sequences of observations such that should an 
individual leave the panel but then return at a later date, we only make use of information up to the 
wave of first exit.   
 
                                                 
5 There is a potential selection issue that is not dealt with here since people in very poor health may not have 
been working in wave 1 and hence cannot be observed to retire in our sample.  
6  Attrition may be endogenous (related to retirement) and we test for this possibility (see Section 5).  
 12
 4.2 Variables  
 
Retirement and labour market status 
As has already been noted in the literature (e.g. Bardasi et al., 2002; Disney et al., 1994) retirement is 
not a well-defined state. It is not always clear whether individuals in the relevant age group are 
economically inactive because they have retired or are simply unemployed for a period of time. This 
problem is exacerbated by pension entitlement because some individuals may associate retirement 
with the final and permanent exiting from work whereas others may not define themselves as 
retired unless they are actually in receipt of pension. Further, social norms and routes into 
retirement via disability and unemployment complicate the self-reporting of labour market status 
for older workers. Humphrey et al., (2003) noted that after State Pension Age people appear to 
redefine their status, with a sudden drop in the numbers of people defining themselves as long-term 
sick or disabled after State Pension Age – from 27% to 1% in men, and from 16% to 4% in 
women.   
 
In line with previous work, the definition of retirement used here is self-reported, in answer to the 
question on job status in which individuals classify their status as one of the following: self-
employed, employed, unemployed, retired, on maternity leave, caring for the family, in full-time 
education, long-term sick or disabled, or on a government training scheme. For the analysis 
reported here we assume that retirement is an absorbing (permanent) state, so that the model 
focuses on the first transition out of the labour market.  
 
Health variables 
The BHPS includes a number of health and health-related variables.  Of particular interest to us is 
the measure of general SAH status described in section 2.1 and an alternative measure of health 
that refers to limitations in daily activities.  
 
The simple five-point SAH variable is a subjective proxy for actual health, and is likely to be 
measured with error and endogenous to labour supply choices (as explained in Section 2.1).  A 
continuity problem arises with this variable because in wave 9 (only) there was a change in the 
question together with a modification to the available response categories.  The wave 9 question 
asks respondents about their ‘general state of health’ (without the age consideration of the original 
version) on the scale: excellent, very good, good, fair, poor.  To achieve consistency over all 12 
waves we follow the method of Hernandez-Quevedo et al., (2005) and recode SAH into the 
following 4-category scale where 1 represents very poor or poor health, 2 fair health, 3 good or very good 
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health and 4 excellent health.  In this way both the original SAH question asked of respondents in 
waves 1 to 8 and 10 to 12 and the wave 9 version of the SAH question are used. 
 
In order to construct the index of health stock variable, described in section 3.2, we use questions 
on specific health problems.  Individuals are asked whether or not they have any of a list of specific 
health problems from the following: arms, legs or hands, sight, hearing, skin conditions or allergies, 
chest/breathing, heart/blood pressure, stomach or digestion, diabetes, anxiety or depression, 
alcohol or drugs, epilepsy or migraine, or other. Hence we create a binary dummy for the presence 
of each specific problem.  
 
Our alternative health measure is self-reported functional limitations, based on the question “does 
your health in any way limit your daily activities compared to most people of your age?7” This is 
arguably more objective that the general SAH question, and more directly related to ability to work 
hence we use it as an alternative to the health stock index in some of the models that we estimate.  
 
Spousal/Partner variables 
We model the impact of health on the timing of retirement separately for men and women.  For 
both we include a variable representing the health status of the individual’s spouse or partner 
(should they have one).  This allows us to investigate the interaction between spousal or partner’s 
health and an individual’s decision to retire.  We also include a variable representing whether a 
spouse or partner is employed.  To reduce concerns over endogeneity bias this variable is lagged 
one period. 
 
Income and wealth   
The main income variable used is the individual specific mean of log household income8 across all 
waves in which individual is observed. In the models reported here we adapt this to the mean 
across all waves prior to retirement, in order to minimise endogeneity problems (as income will 
normally change significantly at retirement). We also have information on pension entitlement, 
which distinguishes between people who have no occupational or private pension, an occupational 
pension, or a private pension. Data on housing tenure are also available, which distinguish between 
people who own their home outright, own with a mortgage, or live in privately rented or local 
authority rented housing.  
 
                                                 
7  This question is not asked in wave 9. In our analysis we assume wave 8 values hold in wave 9.  
8 Household income consists of labour and non-labour equivalised real income, adjusted using the Retail 
Price Index and equivalised by the McClement’s scale to adjust for household size and composition. 
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 Other socio-demographic variables 
Other covariates include age, sex, marital status, educational attainment, and regional dummies. We 
also include variables that indicate the employment sector of the individual in wave 1.  
 
Variable names and definitions are summarised in Table 1. 
 
{Insert Table 1 around here} 
 
 
5. Results 
 
Information on labour market status in each wave is shown in Table 2 for men and women 
together and Table 3 for men and Table 4 for women. The tables also illustrate the loss of 
observations due to attrition. Our sample consists of 1135 individuals reporting employment or 
self-employment status in wave 1 and this figure gradually decreases to 160 by the 12th wave. The 
number of people who classify themselves as retired increases from 82 in wave 2 to 475 in wave 
129.  While the number of men retired at wave 12 represents a 5 fold increase on the number 
reported at wave 2, for women the increase is 7 fold, perhaps reflecting the lower state pension age 
for women compared to men. 
 
{Insert Tables 2, 3  & 4 around here} 
 
Descriptive statistics for both men and women are presented in Table 5.  These are presented for 
all data and broken down by pre and post-retirement.  For both men and women the majority of 
individuals report SAH status as good or very good.  Similar proportions report excellent or fair 
health with by far the lowest reported category being poor or very poor health.10  It is notable that 
the reporting of fair and poor/very poor health increases while the reporting of excellent health is 
lower post-retirement compared to pre-retirement.  This is true for both men and women.  
Similarly the reporting of heath limitations increases post-retirement.  Interestingly, the proportion 
of men whose partner, should they have one, reported fair or poor/very poor SAH is roughly the 
same pre and post-retirement.  For women there is a marked increase in the proportion of partners 
                                                 
9 As noted above retirement is not a permanent exit for some people so of the people classified as retired in 
each wave some may be working again in subsequent waves. However, in this analysis we treat first exit as an 
absorbing state and focus on the first transition into retirement.  
10  While not reported here, average SAH deteriorates through time. This might suggest that respondents are 
not rating their own health ‘compared to other people of your own age …’.  
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reporting fair or poor/ very poor health post-retirement compared to pre-retirement.  For both 
men and women the reporting of health limitations by partners increases post compared to pre-
retirement.    
 
{Insert Table 5 around here} 
 
Of the other variables, the majority of individuals own their houses outright; this proportion 
increases after retirement and is accompanied by a decrease in the proportion of people with an 
outstanding mortgage. In the rental sector the share who live in local authority rented 
accommodation increases after retirement.  The majority of individuals sampled do not have an 
educational qualification, (52% men and 60% women).  Men are much more likely to have paid into 
either a private or occupational pension scheme (94%) compared to women (60%). Most 
individuals report working within the private sector (50% men and 48% women).  Approximately 
an equal number of men and women have partners who are in employment (approximately 40%).   
 
Attrition 
Tables 2 to 4 show how our stock sample of men and women evolves over the twelve waves of 
observation.  A total of 278 men have dropped out of the sample by the end of the twelfth wave. 
This represents 43% of the original sample of 641 men.  The corresponding percentage for women 
is less at 38%, representing 186 non-responses from an original sample of 494 individuals.  For the 
stock sample of individuals we are concerned with, much of the sample non-response is likely to be 
due to health-related attrition.11 However, it may also be related to labour market status (for 
example, see Zabel (1998) and Ziliak and Kniesner (1998)).  A systematic relationship between 
health and labour market participation and non-response may lead to attrition bias in our empirical 
models of the timing of the retirement decision.  To test for attrition bias we use a simple variable 
addition test as proposed by Verbeek and Nijman (1992, p. 688).  The test variable we use is an 
indicator for whether the individual responds in the subsequent wave (NEXT WAVE).12  This is 
regressed, together with the set of conditioning variables depicted in Tables 9 and 10, on the 
retirement indicator using a random effects probit model.  This provides a test for attrition bias.13  
Table 6 presents the variable addition tests for attrition bias estimated using the random effects 
                                                 
11 See Contoyannis, Jones, and Rice (2004) and Jones, Koolman, and Rice, N. (2006) for a discussion of 
health-related attrition and the consequences for models of the determinants of health using the BHPS. 
12 Verbeek and Nijman (1992) also suggest using an indicator of whether the individual responds in all twelve 
waves and/or a count of the number of waves that are observed for the individual.  However, in the context 
of the stock sample we employ where individuals are assumed to be at risk of retirement at the first wave (but 
have not already retired) then one would expect both of these indicators to be related to retirement – the 
longer an individual is observed, the more likely they are to have retired.    
13 It should be noted that the test has low power and is not intended to correct for any observed attrition bias 
(Verbeek, 2000).  
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probit model.  For models of health limitations and latent self-assessed health the tests do not reject 
the null-hypothesis of no attrition bias for both men and women.  It is important to note that those 
exiting the sample because of attrition are treated as censored with respect to the retirement 
decision.  
 
{Insert Table 6 around here} 
 
Kaplan-Meier Survival Curves 
Figures 1 to 8 display Kaplan-Meier estimates of the probability of survival (not retiring) by health 
status.  These are shown for men and women separately and are presented for self-assessed health 
(SAH), health limitations (HLLT), partner’s self-assessed health and whether a partner suffers 
health limitations. In general men reporting very poor/poor or fair SAH have a higher probability 
of retiring than men in good/very good or excellent health (Figure 1).  Men reporting health 
limitations are also associated with a greater probability of retiring compared to men not reporting 
limitations (Figure 2).  Similar results can be found for women for SAH (Figure 5) and health that 
limits daily activities (Figure 6), although the effect of the latter is less than that estimated for men.    
Figures 3 and 4 show Kaplan-Meier estimates for the probability of not retiring for men by the 
reported health status of their partner, should they have a partner.  Analogous results for women 
are displayed in Figures 7 and 8.   Whilst the difference between the effects appear small, in general, 
individuals with partners reporting poor health status (very poor/poor or fair for SAH, or health 
limitations) are associated with an increased probability of retiring compared to individuals with 
partners reporting better health status.  
 
{Insert Figures 1-8 around here} 
 
Health stock 
Tables 7 and 8 show results for the generalised ordered probit models for men and women 
respectively. These models are estimated on all available data for men and women and are not 
restricted to the stock sample used in the discrete-time hazard models.  We do this to derive the 
latent health of a spouse or partner who may be younger than the stock sample will allow.14  
Accordingly, our models consist of approximately 65,000 observations on 12,631 men and 76,000 
observations on 14,490 women. 
 
{Insert Tables 7 & 8 around here} 
                                                 
14 Our stock sample consists of individuals aged 50 years or over at the first wave.  It is possible that a 
respondent’s partner is younger than 50 years. 
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 The first column of each table provides results of the latent health index obtained by regressing the 
self-assessed health (SAH) on objective measures of health problems (HLTHPRB).  For both men 
and women the estimated coefficients display the expected negative sign – health problems are 
associated with lower reporting of self-assessed health. All effects are highly statistically significant. 
For men the dominant effects (in terms of the size of coefficients) are problems with arms, legs or 
hands, problems with chest and breathing, problems with heart or blood pressure, problems with 
stomach or digestion, problems with anxiety or depression, and problems reported as other. A 
similar set of dominant effects are observed for women, with problems with heart and blood 
pressure having a lesser effect than for men and diabetes and problems with alcohol or drugs 
having a larger relative effect than for men.  
 
The other columns of the tables present the results for the measurement model relating the linear 
index to the categories of self-assessed health.  This specification of the model allows for 
differences in the relative positions of the reporting thresholds (cut-points) for sub-groups of the 
population. In particular, we allow for the thresholds to vary by age and socio-economic status.  In 
general, the coefficients, δj,, are positive for the set of age categories and negative for the socio-
economic variables. Recall that, in order to construct a proxy for latent health that is purged of 
latent health, we are making the stringent assumption that any association between SES and SAH, 
after conditioning on the indicators of health problems, reflects reporting bias. This errs on the side 
of caution when we construct the proxy variable. Under this interpretation negative coefficients are 
associated with greater ‘optimism’ in reporting health status – for example, individuals with greater 
educational attainment report higher health status for a given level of underlying latent health 
compared to respondents with lower educational attainment.  For both men and women and for 
each of the cut-points in Tables 7 and 8 we observe a gradient across educational status with the 
coefficients decreasing with increasing education.  These are significant across all cut-points.   The 
coefficients on the labour market status variables are all negative compared to the baseline of 
“other”.  Most notably, the employed (SELF-EMPLOYED and EMPLOYED) appear to be the 
most optimistic in reporting their health status.  Respondents who are unemployed, retired or 
occupied with family care have similar estimated coefficients.   Respondents with higher levels of 
household income also report better health categories for a given level of underlying latent health 
compared to individuals with lower levels of income.  
 
The positive coefficients on the age categories is interesting given that the baseline category is over 
75 for men and over 65 for women.   The implication is that, conditional on the socio-economic 
variables, younger age groups appear less optimistic about their health status compared to older age 
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groups. This may be a consequence of the wording of the self-assessed health question which is age 
benchmarked by asking respondents to assess their health compared to people of their own age.  It 
may be that older respondents are more optimistic when reporting health using an age benchmark 
than younger age groups. This would generate the observed gradient in reporting thresholds by age.  
 
There is no overall pattern across the coefficients on the year dummies.  However, it is worth 
noting that the Yr9900 coefficient stands out over the other coefficients.  This represents the ninth 
wave of the BHPS dataset where the wording and response categories available for the self-assessed 
health question change.  The absolute size of this coefficient compared to the other coefficients 
would suggest that the change of wording leads to reporting bias at wave 9.  This has the effect that 
respondents with lower health status tend to report higher levels of health at wave 9 than at other 
waves and that respondents with higher underlying levels of health tend to report lower health 
status at wave 9 compared to their reporting at other waves.  This would appear to be a 
consequence of the response categories available at wave nine compared to other waves.  At wave 9 
three response categories are available to individuals who rate their health highly: good, very good 
and excellent health.  At other waves only good and excellent health are available.  Accordingly, 
individuals who rate their health as excellent at waves other than wave 9 may rate their health as 
very good when offered this option at wave 9.  Our recoded, four-category version of self-assessed 
health combines good and very good into a single category.  This scenario is consistent with the 
observed positive coefficient on the Yr9900 dummy variable.  Similarly, respondents reporting poor 
health status (the second lowest category) at waves other than wave 9 may report fair health at wave 
9 (corresponding to the second lowest category available at wave 9). Respondents reporting fair 
health at waves other than 9 (middle available category) may report good health at wave 9 (middle 
available category).  This change in reporting at wave 9 would be consistent with a negative 
coefficient on the Yr9900 dummy variable and gives the appearance of respondents being more 
optimistic in reporting health status at wave 9.   
 
The effects of socio-economic characteristics on reporting bias appear to vary across the cut-points.  
The effect of labour market status is greatest for the first threshold making the transition between 
very poor /poor health and fair health. The effects diminish across the three thresholds. This 
implies that, for example, employed individuals in poorer health report more optimistically than 
individuals in better health.  The effect of educational attainment is greatest for the second cut-
point representing the threshold between fair and good/very good health, whilst the effect of 
income is greatest for the third cut-point for women and the second for men. 
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 Discrete-time survival analysis  
Results of the discrete-time hazard models of retirement are presented in Tables 9 and 10.  Each 
table presents results for health limitations in the first set of columns and self-assessed latent health 
in the second set of columns.  For each health model, the estimated coefficients and standard errors 
are shown together with the hazard ratio, which shows the proportional effect on the underling 
(instantaneous) probability of retiring, for a one unit change in the variable in question.  All models 
were estimated in STATA using the pgmhaz routine (Jenkins, 1998).   The models account for 
unobserved heterogeneity using a Gamma mixture distribution (Meyer, 1990).  For all models log-
likelihood ratio tests reject the null hypothesis of no heterogeneity.  
 
{Insert Tables 9 and 10  around here} 
 
Models for men and women show the expected gradient over age categories.  The age categories 
are compared to a baseline of over 69 years for men and over 64 years for women. The hazard for 
retiring is negative for all categories except for ages 65 to 69 for men.  This covers the state 
retirement age and accordingly is positive.  For men, there is a gradient across educational 
attainment such that higher levels of education are associated with a decreasing hazard of retiring. 
However, the effects are significant for degree or higher degree (DEGHDEG) only.  These effects 
are compared to the baseline category of no qualifications.  None of the educational attainment 
dummies are significant for women.  For men, the employment sector variables (measured at the 
first wave) are positive and significant and contrast against a baseline of self-employment.   
Accordingly, the hazard of retirement is greater for employees compared to the self-employed.  The 
largest effect is observed for individuals employed within civil and local government 
(CIVLOCGOV), who have around three times the retirement hazard of men who work in either 
the private (PRIVCOMP) or ‘other’ (JBSECT0) sectors.  The effects are reversed for women where 
the hazard is greater for the self-employed, however the effects are not significant.    
 
We also observe a significant effect of pension entitlements.  These variables represent whether an 
individual has made a contribution into a private pension plan (or an employer has made a 
contribution on behalf of the individual) during the observation period (PRIVPEN) and whether 
an individual has been a member of an employers pension scheme during the observation period 
(EMPPEN).  Compared to the baseline of state only pension entitlement, having a private pension 
is associated with around a 70% decrease in the likelihood of retiring for men (80-85% for women). 
In contrast, having an employer pension increases the likelihood of retiring for men by almost two-
fold but this is not significant for women.  
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 For men if the spouse has a job the probability of retirement is decreased by around 40% but this 
variable is not significant for women. The effects of housing tenure (HSEMORT, HSEAUTH and 
HSERENT), mean logged household income (MLNHINC) and marital status are not significant in 
any of the models. 
 
The primary focus of this paper is the role of health in determining retirement behaviours.  To this 
end we consider both the measure of health limitations (HLLT) and the measure of underlying 
latent health stock (LATSAH) constructed from the generalised ordered probit model. Both of 
these variables are lagged one period to avoid problems of simultaneity. We also condition on the 
first periods health status so that the estimated effect of lagged health can be interpreted as a health 
shock. Further we consider the health of a respondent’s spouse or partner.  Clearly, this can only be 
defined should a respondent have a spouse or partner and therefore needs to be interpreted 
alongside the estimated effect of the marital status variable (MARCOUP).  
 
For men we observe a large, positive and highly significant effect for health limitations.  This 
implies that the hazard of retiring is greater for individuals experiencing a shock to health that leads 
to a health limitation.   For our constructed measure of underlying latent health (which is increasing 
in health) we observe a negative and significant coefficient implying that the retirement hazard 
increases as health decreases.  Again this is interpreted as a shock to health.  For both models, while 
we observe the expected signs, the estimated coefficients on spousal health are not significant.  
 
Results for the health variables for women are similar to the results observed for men.  While health 
limitations have a much larger effect for men than women, the latent health variable attracts a 
similar coefficient estimate for both sexes and is associated with a 30% decrease in the probability 
of retirement.  The effect of spousal health is negative in both models but while it is insignificant 
for health limitations, it is significant at the 6% level for latent health.   
 
 
6. Discussion 
The results reported above show that whichever way we measure own health in these models 
(either negatively via health limitations or positively via latent health stock) it is a key determinant of 
the retirement hazard for both men and women. The size of the health effect in these models is 
large compared to the other significant variables, and in particular is larger than the pension 
entitlement effects.  
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For men the important variables are own health, age, education, pension entitlement, sector of 
employment and whether or not the spouse has a job. Health measured as health limitation is 
quantitatively more important than pension entitlement in terms of its hazard ratio. For women the 
important variables are own health, spouse health, age and having a private pension. Health 
limitations have the largest hazard ratio of all variables in the models estimated for women. The 
significance of spouse health for women and spouse job for men may reflect the different factors 
underlying retirement decisions and the different sex roles within the household. It seems that for 
men having a working spouse increases the chance that they will remain economically active, which 
may provide evidence for the synchronisation of retirement decisions. While for women having a 
spouse in poor health increases the retirement hazard and one possible explanation is the increased 
need to act as a carer for their spouse.  
 
Our models do not contain detailed information on pensions and this is common in the literature 
that focuses on health effects, since detailed health and pension information is rarely available in 
the same data sets. A recent DWP survey found that people had a very low level of knowledge 
about their pensions, which may cast doubt on the need for detailed pension information for our 
modelling objectives (Humphrey et al., 2003). Our main finding in relation to pensions is that for 
both men and women the probability of retirement is reduced for people with a private pension. 
This result is possibly explained by the fact this group of older workers may have acquired private 
pensions at a relatively late stage in their working life in order to top up the state pension which 
they realised would be inadequate. Consequently as the benefits of private pensions are heavily 
dependent on the length of contribution period they encourage longer working lives for this group. 
In contrast occupational pensions are usually more generous and can be drawn at an earlier stage 
(Meghir and Whitehouse, 1997) thus explaining the significance of this variable for men. It is also 
the case that to a certain extent our employment sector variables will reflect pension benefits and 
early retirement arrangements. So that the large positive effect of the civic or local government 
variable for men is explained by arrangements in that sector that are conducive to early retirement.  
 
 
7. Conclusion  
 
For older workers, health status may be an important factor in the decision to retire and this has 
been the primary focus of this paper.  The few studies that do exist in this area have confirmed the 
importance of health; however they rarely take into account the dynamics of the relationship 
between health and retirement or joint decision making by couples, and both of these issues are 
tackled here.   
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 Like the vast majority of the literature we have only subjective information on health status and our 
methods are designed to reduce as far as possible the problems of endogeneity, reporting bias and 
reporting heterogeneity that arise from using this type of information to unravel the causal 
relationships between health and labour market status. We use two alternative indicators of health 
status. Firstly, we estimate a model of SAH as a function of more objective measures of health to 
define a latent ‘health stock’ variable. This model is extended to allow for different reporting 
thresholds in SAH via the use of generalised ordered probits.  Secondly, we use a measure of health 
limitations which is arguably more objective that SAH and thus less prone to the problems of the 
former.  For both measures the causal effect is estimated via a health shock by conditioning on initial 
period health.  
 
Our findings confirm those of a number of other studies; own health is an important determinant 
of the decision to retire and its effect is larger than that of the pension entitlement and income 
variables we include in our models.  This is the case for both men and women and is observed for 
both health limitations and latent health status measures. As expected, negative shocks to health 
result in increases in the hazard of retirement. Further, our results provide evidence that for women 
the health status of their partner has an impact on their retirement decisions.  This effect is not 
evident for men, but men’s probability of retirement is reduced if they have a working spouse.  
 
The trend towards increasing early retirement has obvious fiscal implications as increasing numbers 
of older people become dependent on a shrinking working population. It can also be considered a 
waste of human capital if people with education and skills are leaving the labour force prematurely. 
Designing financial incentives to encourage people to work for longer may not be sufficient as a 
policy tool if people are leaving the labour market involuntarily due to health problems. Instead this 
points to a need for improving the health of the work force and putting resources into facilitating 
continued work for people with health problems and disabilities. In the UK there is little or no 
communication between primary health care providers and employers so an integrated approach to 
is virtually impossible within the current system.  This is exacerbated by the fact that the UK has 
very poor provision of occupational health professionals - about 12 for every 43000 employees 
(CBI, 2004). While the New Deal 50 Plus15 is designed to help older people on benefits get back 
into work, unlike Pathways to Work (DWP 2002) for people on  Incapacity Benefit, the New Deal 
does not provide specific health advice and evidence suggests that this is perceived as a 
shortcoming by potential clients (Kodz and Eccles 2001). Instead the integrated approach of 
Pathways might extended more generally to help older workers with health problems to remain 
                                                 
15 www.newdeal.gov.uk/
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economically active. However, even this programme only targets those workers who have already 
left the labour force whereas it may be more effective to design policy that helps older workers to 
remain economically active.  
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 Table 1: Variable names and definitions 
 
Variable Description 
RETIRED 
HLLT  
SAH 
SAHEX 
SAHGVG 
SAHFAIR 
SAHPVP 
MLNHINC 
HSEOWN 
HSEMORT 
HSERENT 
HSEAUTH 
MARCOUP 
DEGHDEG 
HNDALEV 
OCSE 
NOQUAL 
PRIVPEN 
 
EMPPEN 
 
PRIVCOMP 
CIVLOCGOV 
JBSECTO 
SELFEMP 
JOB 
AGE5054 
AGE5559 
AGE6064 
AGE6569 
NORTHW 
NORTHE 
 
SOUTHE 
SOUTHW 
LONDON 
MIDLAND 
SCOTLAND 
WALES 
 
HLTHPRB 
 
 
 
 
 
Binary dependent variable, = 1 if respondent states they are retired, 0 otherwise. 
Self-assessed health limitations: 1 if health limits daily activities, 0 otherwise 
Self-assessed health; 1: very poor or poor, 2: fair, 3: good or very good, 4: excellent 
Self-assessed health: 1 if excellent, 0 otherwise 
Self-assessed health: 1 if good or very good, 0 otherwise 
Self-assessed health: 1 if fair, 0 otherwise 
Self-assessed health: 1 if poor or very poor, 0 otherwise (baseline category) 
Individual-specific mean of log equivalised real household labour and non-labour income. 
1 if house owned outright, 0 otherwise (baseline category) 
1 if house has outstanding mortgage, 0 otherwise 
1 if house is rented, 0 otherwise 
1 if house is owned by housing authority / association, 0 otherwise 
1 if married or living as a couple, 0 otherwise 
1 if highest educational attainment is degree or higher degree, 0 otherwise. 
1 if highest educational attainment is HND or A level, 0 otherwise. 
1 if highest educational attainment is O level or CSE, 0 otherwise. 
1 if no qualifications, 0 otherwise (baseline category). 
1 if respondent has made contributions to a private pension plan during observation period, 0 
otherwise. 
1 if respondent has been a member of an employers (occupational) pension plan during 
observation period, 0 otherwise 
1 if respondent’s sector of employment is within the private sector, 0 otherwise 
1 if respondent’s sector of employment is within civic or local government, 0 otherwise 
1 if respondent’s sector of employment is other to above, 0 otherwise  
1 if respondent is self-employed, 0 otherwise (baseline category) 
1 if respondent’s spouse / partner has a job, 0 otherwise 
1 if respondent is aged 50 to 54 (inclusive), 0 otherwise 
1 if respondent is aged 55 to 59 (inclusive), 0 otherwise 
1 if respondent is aged 60 to 64 (inclusive), 0 otherwise 
1 if respondent is aged 65 to 69 (inclusive), 0 otherwise 
1 if respondent resides in North West, Merseyside or Greater Manchester, 0 otherwise 
1 if respondent resides in North, South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, North Yorkshire, 
Humberside or Tyne & Wear, 0 otherwise. 
1 if respondent resides in South East or East Anglia, 0 otherwise (baseline category) 
1 if respondent resides in South West, 0 otherwise 
1 if respondent resides in Inner or Outer London, 0 otherwise 
1 if respondent resides in East or West Midlands or West Midc , 0 otherwise 
1 if respodent resides in Scotland, 0 otherwise. 
1 if respondents resides in Wales, 0 otherwise. 
 
Self-reported health problems: 1 if problem reported, 0 otherwise. There are also individual 
dummies for problems with: arms, legs or hands (arms), sight (see), hearing (hear), skin 
conditions or allergies (skin) chest/breathing (chest), heart/blood pressure (heart), stomach or 
digestion (stomach), diabetes (diabetes), anxiety or depression (anxiety), alcohol or drugs 
(alcohol), epilepsy (epilepsy), migraine (migraine) or Other (other). 
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Table 2: Labour market status by wave 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Attrition 
Self-employed 
Employed 
Unemployed 
Retired 
LT sick, disabled 
Other 
Deaths 
Total 
In work* 
 
214 
921 
 
 
 
 
 
1135 
1135 
122 
169 
691 
26 
82 
13 
26 
6 
1135 
860 
193 
153 
559 
24 
152 
28 
18 
8 
1135 
712 
247 
134 
470 
29 
190 
30 
26 
9 
1135 
604 
296 
116 
394 
22 
239 
33 
23 
12 
1135 
510 
331 
111 
344 
16 
269 
33 
25 
6 
1135 
455 
347 
94 
302 
13 
320 
33 
17 
9 
1135 
396 
365 
83 
260 
7 
359 
30 
22 
9 
1135 
343 
391 
62 
215 
6 
400 
23 
25 
13 
1135 
277 
418 
54 
175 
8 
442 
15 
16 
7 
1135 
229 
441 
59 
144 
0 
462 
15 
10 
4 
1135 
203 
464 
47 
113 
3 
475 
10 
13 
10 
1135 
160 
* Employed and self-employed 
 
 
Table 3: Labour market status by wave – men 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Attrition 
Self-employed 
Employed 
Unemployed 
Retired 
LT sick, disabled 
Other 
Deaths 
Total 
In work* 
 
162 
479 
 
 
 
 
 
641 
641 
68 
138 
349 
19 
50 
11 
2 
4 
641 
487 
116 
124 
270 
20 
80 
23 
2 
6 
641 
394 
146 
105 
228 
23 
105 
25 
2 
7 
641 
333 
176 
97 
193 
13 
125 
27 
1 
9 
641 
290 
199 
89 
169 
10 
141 
28 
1 
4 
641 
258 
209 
76 
147 
9 
168 
25 
3 
4 
641 
223 
222 
68 
129 
5 
187 
22 
1 
7 
641 
197 
235 
53 
104 
6 
214 
19 
4 
6 
641 
157 
248 
46 
93 
5 
226 
13 
5 
5 
641 
139 
262 
49 
78 
0 
233 
14 
1 
4 
641 
127 
278 
38 
62 
2 
241 
10 
1 
9 
641 
100 
* Employed and self-employed 
 
 
Table 4: Labour market status by wave - women 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Attrition 
Self-employed 
Employed 
Unemployed 
Retired 
LT sick, disabled 
Other 
Deaths 
Total 
In work* 
 
52 
442 
 
 
 
 
 
494 
494 
54 
31 
342 
7 
32 
2 
24 
2 
494 
373 
77 
29 
289 
4 
72 
5 
16 
2 
494 
318 
101 
29 
242 
6 
85 
5 
24 
2 
494 
271 
120 
19 
201 
9 
114 
6 
22 
3 
494 
220 
132 
22 
175 
6 
128 
5 
24 
2 
494 
197 
138 
18 
155 
4 
152 
8 
14 
5 
494 
173 
143 
15 
131 
2 
172 
8 
21 
2 
494 
146 
156 
9 
111 
0 
186 
4 
21 
7 
494 
120 
170 
8 
82 
3 
216 
2 
11 
2 
494 
90 
179 
10 
66 
0 
229 
1 
9 
0 
494 
76 
186 
9 
51 
1 
234 
0 
12 
1 
494 
60 
* Employed and self-employed 
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 Table 5: Descriptive statistics  
 Men 
 
Women 
 All Pre - 
Retirement
Post - 
Retirement
All 
 
Pre – 
Retirement
Post - 
Retirement 
 
RETIRED 
 
Own Health 
HLLT  
SAHEX 
SAHGVG 
SAHFAIR 
SAHPVP 
 
Spousal Health 
HLLT  
SAHEX 
SAHGVG 
SAHFAIR 
SAHPVP 
 
Covariates 
HSEOWN 
HSEMORT  
HSERENT 
HSEAUTH 
MARCOUP 
DEGHDEG 
HNDALEV 
OCSE 
PRIVPEN 
EMPPEN 
PRIVCOMP 
CIVLOCGOV 
JBSECTO 
JOB 
.324 
 
 
.156 
.238 
.486 
.213 
.064 
 
 
.180 
.156 
.431 
.191 
.085 
 
 
.522 
.320 
.046 
.112 
.867 
.084 
.180 
.217 
.402 
.539 
.503 
.137 
.100 
.413 
 
0 
 
 
.127 
.257 
.485 
.200 
.058 
 
 
.166 
.171 
.437 
.192 
.084 
 
 
.421 
.415 
.054 
.109 
.886 
.087 
.188 
.214 
.454 
.527 
.488 
.123 
.098 
.528 
 
1 
 
 
.216 
.197 
.488 
.240 
.075 
 
 
.207 
.126 
.419 
.191 
.088 
 
 
.732 
.122 
.027 
.118 
.827 
.078 
.164 
.223 
.274 
.563 
.534 
.167 
.105 
.174 
 
.365 
 
 
.139 
.209 
.521 
.209 
.061 
 
 
.149 
.157 
.338 
.171 
.062 
 
 
.563 
.247 
.044 
.147 
.744 
.061 
.113 
.235 
.224 
.372 
.483 
.205 
.209 
.369 
 
0 
 
 
.110 
.241 
.514 
.193 
.053 
 
 
.140 
.183 
.356 
.161 
.059 
 
 
.484 
.322 
.055 
.139 
.774 
.064 
.114 
.243 
.266 
.380 
.494 
.202 
.204 
.493 
 
1 
 
 
.190 
.153 
.535 
.238 
.075 
 
 
.164 
.113 
.307 
.187 
.068 
 
 
.699 
.116 
.024 
.160 
.691 
.057 
.110 
.221 
.142 
.359 
.465 
.210 
.217 
.153 
 
 
 
Table 6: Verbeek and Nijman test for attrition bias: based on random effects probit models 
of retired against health limitations or latent self-assessed health and set of conditioning 
variables that appear in Tables 9 & 10 
 NT β  S.E. z-test p-value 
NEXT WAVE 
Men 
      Health limitations 
      Latent self-assessed health 
Women 
      Health Limitations 
      Latent self-assessed health 
 
 
4016 
3968 
 
3210 
3133 
 
 
.097 
.149 
 
-.089 
-.142 
 
 
.175 
.180 
 
.183 
.194 
 
 
.55 
.83 
 
-.49 
-.73 
 
 
.582 
.409 
 
.625 
.465 
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Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by SAH
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Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier estimate of the proportion of men not retired by self-assessed 
health (SAH). 
 
 
 
Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by health_limitations
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Figure 2: Kaplan-Meier estimates of the proportion of men not retired by health limitations 
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Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by Partner_SAH
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Figure 3: Kaplan-Meier estimates of the proportion of men not retired by partner’s self-
assesed health status 
 
 
 
Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by Partner_health_limitations
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Figure 4: Kaplan-Meier estimates of the proportion of men not retired by partner’s health 
limitations 
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Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by SAH
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Figure 5: Kaplan-Meier estimate of the proportion of women not retired by self-assessed 
health (SAH). 
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Figure 6: Kaplan-Meier estimates of the proportion of men not retired by health limitations 
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Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by Partner_SAH
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Figure 7: Kaplan-Meier estimates of the proportion of women not retired by partner’s self-
assesed health status 
 
 
 
 
Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by Partner_health_limitations
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Figure 8: Kaplan-Meier estimates of the proportion of women not retired by partner’s 
health limitations 
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Table 7: Generalised Ordered Probit model for SAH –  Men 
 
Men NT = 64,802 
          N = 12,631 
 
 
  Cut-Point 2 Cut-Point 3 Cut-Point 4 
Latent Health Index Coef. S.E. Measurement 
Model 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
 
Health Problems 
(HLTHPRB): 
Arms, Legs or hands 
Sight 
Hearing 
Skin condition or allergies 
Chest / Breathing 
Heart / Blood pressure 
Stomach or digestion 
Diabetes 
Anxiety / Depression 
Alcohol or Drugs 
Epilepsy 
Migraine 
Other 
 
 
 
 
-.640 
-.236 
-.118 
-.075 
-.640 
-.597 
-.679 
-.522 
-.754 
-.450 
-.484 
-.302 
-.743 
 
 
 
 
 
(.017) 
(.030) 
(.024) 
(.023) 
(.022) 
(.023) 
(.027) 
(.044) 
(.032) 
(.085) 
(.093) 
(.031) 
(.033) 
 
 
 
 
Age Groups: 
15-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
60-64 
65-69 
70-74 
MARCOUP 
DEGHDEG 
HNDALEV 
OCSE 
SELF-
EMPLOYED 
EMPLOYED 
UNEMPLOYED 
RETIRED 
FAMILY CARE 
LNINC 
CONSTANT 
Year Dummies 
Yr 9293 
Yr 9394 
Yr 9495 
Yr 9596 
Yr 9697 
Yr 9798 
Yr 9899 
Yr 9900 
Yr 0001 
Yr 0102 
Yr 0203 
 
 
 
 
.128 
.501 
.530 
.564 
.513 
.514 
.539 
.445 
.281 
.065 
-.005 
-.035 
-.039 
-.372 
-.170 
-.115 
-.845 
-.777 
-.507 
-.382 
-.525 
-.059 
-
1.270 
 
.004 
-.048 
.011 
-.008 
-.013 
-.042 
.068 
-.467 
-.003 
-.090 
-.087 
 
 
 
(.090) 
(.084) 
(.084) 
(.082) 
(.082) 
(.082) 
(.080) 
(.079) 
(.078) 
(.073) 
(.059) 
(.054) 
(.030) 
(.055) 
(.038) 
(.039) 
(.062) 
(.040) 
(.048) 
(.061) 
(.120) 
(.018) 
(.180) 
 
(.042) 
(.045) 
(.045) 
(.046) 
(.045) 
(.044) 
(.044) 
(.046) 
(.041) 
(.041) 
(.042) 
 
 
 
.111 
.395 
.419 
.409 
.416 
.354 
.327 
.302 
.273 
.167 
.114 
.090 
-.014 
-.442 
-.321 
-.222 
-.633 
-.548 
-.291 
-.375 
-.291 
-.092 
.016 
 
.034 
.032 
.063 
.093 
.076 
.086 
.111 
-.269 
.131 
.063 
.058 
 
 
 
(.064) 
(.061) 
(.060) 
(.059) 
(.059) 
(.059) 
(.058) 
(.057) 
(.055) 
(.052) 
(.045) 
(.042) 
(.023) 
(.036) 
(.028) 
(.027) 
(.040) 
(.031) 
(.036) 
(.046) 
(.077) 
(.012) 
(.126) 
 
(.027) 
(.028) 
(.029) 
(.029) 
(.029) 
(.029) 
(.029) 
(.029) 
(.027) 
(.027) 
(.027) 
 
 
 
.124 
.179 
.151 
.167 
.192 
.159 
.137 
.117 
.112 
.004 
-.035 
-.013 
.010 
-.287 
-.183 
-.080 
-.260 
-.187 
-.053 
-.099 
-.038 
-.082 
1.065 
 
.106 
.138 
.168 
.221 
.187 
.108 
.212 
.500 
.226 
.113 
.131
 
 
 
(.073) 
(.071) 
(.070) 
(.070) 
(.070) 
(.070) 
(.070) 
(.070) 
(.068) 
(.064) 
(.057) 
(.053) 
(.024) 
(.035) 
(.029) 
(.029) 
(.040) 
(.031) 
(.039) 
(.053) 
(.079) 
(.012) 
(.133) 
 
(.024) 
(.026) 
(.027) 
(.027) 
(.027 
(.026) 
(.027) 
(.027) 
(.026) 
(.025) 
(.026) 
Likelihood          -66745.9 
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Table 8: Generalised Ordered Probit model for SAH – Women 
 
Men NT = 75,980 
          N = 14,490 
 
 
  Cut-Point 2 Cut-Point 3 Cut-Point 4 
Latent Health Index Coef. S.E. Measurement Model Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
 
Health Problems 
(HLTHPRB): 
Arms, Legs or hands 
Sight 
Hearing 
Skin condition or allergies 
Chest / Breathing 
Heart / Blood pressure 
Stomach or digestion 
Diabetes 
Anxiety / Depression 
Alcohol or Drugs 
Epilepsy 
Migraine 
Other 
 
 
 
 
-.649 
-.192 
-.113 
-.098 
-.594 
-.482 
-.617 
-.630 
-.738 
-.671 
-.527 
-.253 
-.827 
 
 
 
 
(.015) 
(.026) 
(.026) 
(.017) 
(.020) 
(.019) 
(.024) 
(.044) 
(.021) 
(.122) 
(.080) 
(.019) 
(.024) 
 
 
 
 
Age Groups: 
15-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
60-64 
65-69 
70-74 
MARCOUP 
DEGHDEG 
HNDALEV 
OCSE 
SELF-EMPLOYED 
EMPLOYED 
UNEMPLOYED 
RETIRED 
FAMILY CARE 
LNINC 
CONSTANT 
Year Dummies 
Yr 9293 
Yr 9394 
Yr 9495 
Yr 9596 
Yr 9697 
Yr 9798 
Yr 9899 
Yr 9900 
Yr 0001 
Yr 0102 
Yr 0203 
 
 
 
 
.095 
.309 
.408 
.385 
.337 
.257 
.255 
.110 
-.030 
-.154 
-.177 
-.099 
.044 
-.410 
-.229 
-.196 
-.679 
-.718 
-.445 
-.484 
-.500 
-.040 
-1.215 
 
-.022 
-.082 
-.123 
-.098 
-.091 
-.055 
-.053 
-.630 
-.066 
-.080 
-.065
 
 
 
(.066) 
(.061) 
(.061) 
(.059) 
(.059) 
(.060) 
(.060) 
(.059) 
(.058) 
(.053) 
(.050) 
(.044) 
(.025) 
(.044) 
(.036) 
(.030) 
(.068) 
(.036) 
(.054) 
(.047) 
(.038) 
(.015) 
(.149) 
 
(.034) 
(.037) 
(.038) 
(.038) 
(.039) 
(.036) 
(.037) 
(.040) 
(.034) 
(.035) 
(.035) 
 
 
 
.128 
.317 
.326 
.302 
.251 
.194 
.215 
.110 
.056 
-.098 
-.117 
-.069 
.040 
-.465 
-.352 
-.279 
-.501 
-.473 
-.207 
-.305 
-.285 
-.092 
.082 
 
.002 
.023 
.048 
.075 
.073 
.081 
.068 
-.364 
.079 
.041 
.053 
 
 
 
(.052) 
(.049) 
(.048) 
(.047) 
(.048) 
(.048) 
(.047) 
(.046) 
(.045) 
(.042) 
(.040) 
(.036) 
(.019) 
(.033) 
(.027) 
(.024) 
(.051) 
(.028) 
(.039) 
(.038) 
(.031) 
(.011) 
(.108) 
 
(.023) 
(.025) 
(.025) 
(.026) 
(.026) 
(.026) 
(.026) 
(.026) 
(.024) 
(.024) 
(.025) 
 
 
 
 
.251 
.233 
.152 
.102 
.120 
.044 
.074 
.091 
.009 
-.102 
-.062 
-.025 
.061 
-.304 
-.217 
-.176 
-.235 
-.068 
.048 
-.025 
-.007 
-.105 
1.328 
 
.064 
.135 
.200 
.217 
.203 
.132 
.205 
.446 
.194 
.068 
.079
 
 
 
(.060) 
(.058) 
(.058) 
(.057) 
(.057) 
(.058) 
(.058) 
(.057) 
(.056) 
(.052) 
(.050) 
(.049) 
(.021) 
(.036) 
(.030) 
(.028) 
(.053) 
(.030) 
(.046) 
(.046) 
(.035) 
(.012) 
(.123) 
 
(.024) 
(.025) 
(.026) 
(.026) 
(.027) 
(.026) 
(.027) 
(.026) 
(.025) 
(.024) 
(.025) 
Likelihood          -78958.1 
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Table 9: Hazard model for retirement transition – Men 
 
Men  
 Health Limitations 
N = 3006 
General Health 
N = 2967 
 Coef S.E. Hazard 
ratio 
Coef S.E. Hazard 
ratio 
Own Health: 
HLLT(t-1) 
HLLT(0) 
LATSAH(t-1) 
LATSAH(0) 
 
Spousal Health: 
HLLT 
LATSAH 
 
Spousal Job: 
JOB(t-1) 
 
Covariates: 
AGE5054 
AGE5559 
AGE6064 
AGE6569 
MARCOUP 
DEGHDEG 
HNDALEV 
OCSE 
HSEMORT(t-1) 
HSEAUTH(t-1) 
HSERENT(t-1) 
MLNHINC 
PRIVPEN 
EMPPEN 
PRIVCOMP(0) 
CIVLOCGOV(0) 
JBSECTO(0) 
 
 
1.490 
.217 
 
 
 
 
.201 
 
 
 
-.441 
 
 
-4.269 
-3.639 
-2.726 
.466 
-.471 
-1.165 
-.299 
-.116 
.110 
-.239 
-.234 
.530 
-1.282 
.782 
1.015 
2.065 
.861 
 
 
(.319) 
(.545) 
 
 
 
 
(.251) 
 
 
 
(.220) 
 
 
(.761) 
(.645) 
(.580) 
(.420) 
(.368) 
(.505) 
(.341) 
(.337) 
(.258) 
(.410) 
(.527) 
(.289) 
(.332) 
(.371) 
(.387) 
(.544) 
(.522) 
 
4.437 
1.242 
 
 
 
 
1.223 
 
 
 
.643 
 
 
.014 
.026 
.066 
1.594 
.625 
.312 
.742 
.891 
1.116 
.787 
.791 
1.699 
.278 
2.185 
2.759 
7.886 
2.366 
 
 
 
 
-.487 
.053 
 
 
 
-.077 
 
 
-.520 
 
 
-3.868 
-3.240 
-2.408 
.586 
-.450 
-1.015 
-.290 
-.118 
.186 
-.203 
-.280 
.461 
-1.239 
.703 
.933 
1.960 
.889 
 
 
 
(.185) 
(.253) 
 
 
 
(.150) 
 
 
(.214) 
 
 
(.751) 
(.642) 
(.596) 
(.417) 
(.375) 
(.481) 
(.326) 
(.327) 
(.257) 
(.394) 
(.515) 
(.277) 
(.338) 
(.361) 
(.367) 
(.526) 
(.505) 
 
 
 
 
.614 
1.054 
 
 
 
.925 
 
 
.595 
 
 
.021 
.039 
.090 
1.797 
.637 
.362 
.748 
.889 
1.204 
.816 
.756 
1.585 
.290 
2.019 
2.542 
7.097 
2.433 
 
Log Likelihood 
Chi-squared(1 df)†  
P – value 
 
-711.1 
43.1 
<0.001 
 -712.6 
31.35 
<0.001 
 
     
 
 
† LR test of model with gamma distributed heterogeneity (H1) against model without controlling for 
heterogeneity (H0). 
All models contain a set of regional area dummies to control for differences in labour market 
conditions – results not shown to conserve space. 
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Table 10: Hazard model for retirement transition – Women 
 
Women  
 Health Limitations 
N = 2196 
General Health 
N = 2141 
 Coef S.E. Hazard 
ratio 
Coef S.E. Hazard 
ratio 
Own Health: 
HLLT(t-1) 
HLLT(0) 
LATSAH(t-1) 
LATSAH(0) 
 
Spousal Health: 
HLLT(t-1) 
LATSAH 
 
Spousal Job: 
JOB(t-1) 
 
Covariates: 
AGE5054 
AGE5559 
AGE6064 
MARCOUP 
DEGHDEG 
HNDALEV 
OCSE 
HSEMORT(t-1) 
HSEAUTH(t-1) 
HSERENT(t-1) 
MLNHINC 
PRIVPEN 
EMPPEN 
PRIVCOMP(0) 
CIVLOCGOV(0) 
JBSECTO(0) 
 
 
.810 
-.258 
 
 
 
 
-.105 
 
 
 
-.213 
 
 
-3.485 
-3.337 
-1.357 
.038 
.055 
.236 
-.304 
-.387 
.128 
-.313 
.386 
-1.642 
.554 
-.671 
-.941 
-.827
 
(.295) 
(.550) 
 
 
 
 
(.297) 
 
 
 
(.273) 
 
 
(.668) 
(.627) 
(.424) 
(.373) 
(.615) 
(.488) 
(.360) 
(.279) 
(.437) 
(.623) 
(.349) 
(.492) 
(.338) 
(.632) 
(.709) 
(.671) 
 
2.248 
.773 
 
 
 
 
.900 
 
 
 
.808 
 
 
.031 
.036 
.257 
1.038 
1.057 
1.266 
.738 
.679 
1.136 
.731 
1.472 
.194 
1.740 
.511 
.390 
.437 
 
 
 
 
-.475 
-.021 
 
 
 
-.402 
 
 
-.130 
 
 
-3.823 
-3.865 
-1.652 
-.282 
.034 
.162 
-.419 
-.467 
.001 
-.346 
.641 
-1.931 
.682 
-1.352 
-1.621 
-1.380 
 
 
 
(.203) 
(..370) 
 
 
 
(.211) 
 
 
(.300) 
 
 
(.780) 
(.743) 
(.492) 
(.466) 
(.740) 
(.589) 
(.429) 
(.320) 
(.517) 
(.680) 
(.423) 
(.633) 
(.404) 
(.931) 
(1.020) 
(.937) 
 
 
 
 
.622 
.980 
 
 
 
.670 
 
 
.878 
 
 
.022 
.021 
.192 
.754 
1.035 
1.175 
.658 
.627 
1.001 
.707 
1.899 
.145 
1.978 
.259 
.198 
.252 
Log Likelihood 
Chi-squared(1 df)†  
P – value 
 
-672..7 
20.93 
<0.001 
 -648.7 
44.89 
<0.001 
 
   
 
   
† LR test of model with gamma distributed heterogeneity (H1) against model without controlling for 
heterogeneity (H0). 
All models contain a set of regional area dummies to control for differences in labour market 
conditions – results not shown to conserve space. 
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